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Defensive Patent Litigation Strategy for
Chinese Companies: A Review of the
Extraterritorial Reach of the United
States Patent Laws
Lisa D. Zang*
China has experienced an extraordinary transformation from a
poor, developing nation into a global economic power. With China
becoming one of the U.S.’s largest trading partners, however,
Chinese companies have become increasingly enmeshed in U.S.
patent litigations. Although the U.S. patent laws are intended only
to govern conduct within the nation’s borders, the line between domestic and foreign economic activities has become increasingly
blurred. Modern sales transactions often span multiple countries,
and in such situations, it may not be clear whether the U.S. patent
laws apply. For Chinese companies facing exposure to U.S. patent
litigations, it is critical to understand what qualifies as an infringing
“sale” and “offer to sell” within the U.S. for purposes of determining patent infringement liability and damages. It is also important
to understand the circumstances under which a foreign company
may be liable for patent infringement in the U.S. if products that are
manufactured and sold overseas independently make their way into
the U.S. This Article addresses the foregoing issues against the
backdrop of the extraterritorial reach and limitations of the U.S.
patent laws.
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INTRODUCTION

In the span of forty years, China has experienced an extraordinary transformation from a poor, developing nation into a global
economic power. Since the initiation of free market economic reforms and trade liberalization in 1979, China has achieved real GDP
growth of close to 10% annually—a rate described by the World
Bank as “the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history.”1 In the wake of this unprecedented growth, China has become
the U.S.’s largest merchandise trading partner, largest source of imports, and third largest export market. 2
But success begets attention. With the amount of business that
Chinese companies do with the U.S., Chinese companies and those

1

WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33534, CHINA’S ECONOMIC RISE:
HISTORY, TRENDS, CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1 (2019).
2
Id.
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that do business with them have become increasingly enmeshed in
U.S. patent litigations.3 Some Chinese litigants may ask: how can
this be, when the U.S. patent laws are only intended to govern conduct within the nation’s borders and not that which lies beyond? The
reality is that the line between domestic and foreign economic activities has become increasingly blurred in recent years, with modern marketing, design, manufacturing, and sales transactions each
spanning multiple countries. Consider a situation where the substantial activities of a sales transaction, such as the execution of an
agreement for processors manufactured in China and sold within
Asia, take place in the U.S. Alternatively, consider a situation where
chips manufactured in China and sold to customers within Asia are
incorporated into smartphones that independently make their way to
the U.S., where the nation’s patent laws apply with full force. In
such situations, it may not be clear whether the U.S. patent laws apply to the transactions at issue.
For Chinese companies facing exposure to U.S. patent litigations, there are three important questions to answer. First, what qualifies as an infringing “sale” within the U.S. for purposes of determining patent infringement liability and damages? Second, what
qualifies as an infringing “offer to sell” within the U.S. for purposes
of making those same determinations? Third, under what circumstances can a foreign company be liable for patent infringement in
the U.S. where products manufactured and sold overseas independently make their way to the U.S.?
This Article addresses the foregoing questions against the backdrop of the extraterritorial reach and limitations of the U.S. patent
laws. In Part II, this Article reviews what qualifies as an infringing
“sale” within the U.S. Additionally, Part II evaluates recent cases
where foreign defendants successfully argued that their overseas activities did not qualify as sales within the U.S., as well as cases
where foreign defendants were unsuccessful in making similar arguments. Part II also identifies defensive patent litigation strategies
for Chinese companies in view of the legal framework and case studies. In Part III, this Article performs the same analysis for “offers to
3

Cindy Yang et al., Panel 1: Issues in the U.S. for Chinese Businesses, 24 CARDOZO J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 457, 466 (2016).
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sell” within the U.S. In Part IV, this Article conducts the same analysis for induced infringement of U.S. patents. In Part V, this Article
concludes with observations regarding U.S. patent litigation strategies for Chinese companies moving forward.
I.

“SALES” WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

A. Legal Framework
The general rule under U.S. patent law is that no infringement
occurs when an accused product is made and sold in another country.4 As Justice White wrote in 1972, “[o]ur patent system makes
no claim to extraterritorial effect; ‘these acts of Congress do not,
and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United
States.’”5 Thus, the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have made
clear that the U.S. patent laws, like other laws, must be understood
in view of a deep-rooted presumption against extraterritorial reach. 6
Any doubt as to whether an act falls within the reach of the U.S.
patent laws should be resolved in favor of the presumption against
extraterritoriality7 (i.e., in favor of a finding that the act does not
infringe). This presumption applies not only to identifying what
conduct qualifies as infringing for liability purposes, but also to
determining the amount of damages that may be imposed for such
conduct.8
The general infringement provision of the U.S. Patent Act, 35
U.S.C. § 271(a) (“Section 271(a)”), addresses most infringements
that occur “within the United States.”9 Section 271(a) states as
follows:
“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention,
4

Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441 (2007).
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972) (citing Brown v.
Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195 (1856)).
6
Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283, 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (citing Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 454; Deepsouth Packing, 406 U.S. at 531).
7
Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 454.
8
Carnegie Mellon, 807 F.3d at 1306 (citing Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild
Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
9
35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
5

2021]

DEFENSIVE PATENT LITIGATION

471

within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the
patent.”10
Thus, it is an act of infringement under Section 271(a) to make,
use, sell, or offer to sell a patented invention within the U.S. or import a patented invention into the U.S.11
To determine whether a “sale” has occurred within the U.S.,
courts consider whether the defendant’s activities in the U.S. are
sufficient to qualify as a “sale” under Section 271(a) given the strong
policy against extraterritorial liability.12 Determining where a sale
has occurred, however, may be neither simple nor straightforward.
As the Federal Circuit put it, “[t]he standards for determining where
a sale may be said to occur do not pinpoint a single, universally
applicable fact that determines the answer, and it is not even settled
whether a sale can have more than one location.”13 This is particularly true in today’s age, where supply chains and sales cycles often
span multiple countries and domestic activity can have foreign
effects while foreign activity can likewise have domestic effects.
Nonetheless, courts have held that places relevant to determining where a sale has occurred include: the place where tangible property is transferred or delivered; the place where a contract for the
transfer or delivery of tangible property is executed; the place where
performance actually occurs or is expected to occur under a contract;
the place where specific orders of products are negotiated and finalized; and the place where other substantial activities of a sales transaction occur.14 When all such “substantial activities” of a sales transaction take place outside the U.S., less “substantial” activities, such
as pricing and contract negotiations, in the U.S. are, on their own,
insufficient to transform the foreign activities into a sale “within the
United States.”15
10

Id.
Id.
12
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated
on other grounds, Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).
13
Carnegie Mellon, 807 F.3d at 1308.
14
Id. at 1308–09; Halo Elecs., 769 F.3d at 1379; Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1310–11 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
15
Halo Elecs., 769 F.3d at 1379.
11
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B. Case Studies
This Article first analyzes summary judgment cases. A “summary judgment” is a judgment that is summarily entered by a court
for one party and against another party.16 In other words, the judgment is entered without a trial.17 As a result, a successful summary
judgment motion may significantly reduce overall legal expenditures for a case by disposing of all or a subset of the claims before
trial.18
A court may grant summary judgment if it decides that the
moving party is entitled to prevail under the existing law and there
are no material (i.e., major) factual issues. 19 If summary judgment
is denied, the remaining claims in the case proceed to trial for determination by a judge or jury.20 Thus, a non-movant that prevails at
the summary judgment stage may nevertheless lose on the same
claims at trial.21
1. Lake Cherokee v. Marvell
In Lake Cherokee Hard Drive Technologies, L.L.C. v. Marvell
Semiconductor, Inc., the defendant, Marvell Semiconductor, Inc.
(“Marvell”), obtained partial summary judgment that 77% of the
sales of its chips did not occur within the U.S.22 As a result, Marvell
was not liable for these foreign chip sales and they were excluded
from presentation to the jury at trial. 23
The issue in this case was whether Marvell’s domestic activities
qualified as sales under Section 271(a). 24 Marvell was a California16

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–52 (1986); HON. VIRGINIA A.
PHILLIPS & HON. KAREN L. STEVENSON, RUTTER GRP. PRAC. GUIDE: FED. CIV. PROC.
BEFORE TRIAL § 14-A (9th ed. 2020).
17
PHILLIPS & STEVENSON, supra note 16.
18
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–52 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327
(1986)).
19
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Edward Brunet, Markman Hearings, Summary Judgment, and
Judicial Discretion, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 93, 98–99 (2005).
20
PHILLIPS & STEVENSON, supra note 16.
21
Id.
22
Lake Cherokee Hard Drive Techs., L.L.C. v. Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 964 F.
Supp. 2d 653, 658 (E.D. Tex. 2013).
23
Id.
24
Id. at 657.

2021]

DEFENSIVE PATENT LITIGATION

473

based chip supplier with no offices outside the U.S. 25 Marvell conducted certain sales-related activities within the U.S., including preparing and submitting written proposals in response to requests for
proposal from U.S. customers; designing chips, providing working
samples of chips, and negotiating prices for the chips once a customer had selected a particular Marvell proposal; achieving “design
win[s]” with customers, which meant that the customer would purchase all of the chips that it needed for a particular end product from
Marvell; and entering into product supply agreements with these
customers to memorialize Marvell’s agreement with the customer
on the specification and price of the chip featured in the design
win.26 Customers could only submit purchase orders for quantities
of the chip if a supply agreement was in place. 27
Customers outside the U.S. submitted purchase orders for chips
to Marvell Asia Pte Ltd. (“MAPL”), a third party Singaporean company based in Singapore.28 Following the submission of these purchase orders, a third party Taiwanese company manufactured the
chips abroad.29 Marvell International, a Bermuda company (“Marvell Bermuda”), purchased the chips from the Taiwanese manufacturer and owned the chips until it transferred title to MAPL, which
held title to the chips until they were delivered to the customer.30
Revenue from these sales was placed in Singapore and Bermuda. 31
77% of these chips were not sold into the U.S. market and never
otherwise entered the U.S.32 The remaining 23% of these chips were
incorporated by third party customers (such as hard drive manufacturers and original equipment manufacturer (“OEMs”)) into products that were subsequently sold in the U.S.33
The court found that sales of the 77% of chips that never entered
the U.S. were not sales “within the United States” under Section

25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Id. at 656.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 656-57.
Id. at 656.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 657.
Id. at 657–58.
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271(a).34 These sales had occurred by purchase orders submitted
outside the U.S. to third party MAPL, and the chips sold via those
purchase orders had been manufactured abroad, delivered abroad,
and never entered the U.S.35 The court also noted that finding otherwise would improperly convert the act of entering into a product
supply agreement within the U.S. into a conduit for liability every
time a purchase order was submitted and fulfilled outside the U.S.,
even when the accused products never entered the U.S.36 Thus, the
court granted partial summary judgment that the 77% of foreign chip
sales did not infringe the asserted patents. 37
The court, however, determined that there was an issue of material fact as to whether the 23% of sales of chips that were eventually
brought into the U.S. by downstream customers were infringing
sales under Section 271(a).38 The court denied summary judgment
with respect to those sales.39
For companies that make a substantial portion of their sales
outside the U.S., eliminating foreign sales from the calculation of
patent infringement damages is critical. By way of example,
Chinese information and communications technology provider
Huawei’s sales in the U.S. are only a fraction of its sales elsewhere
in the world.40 Likewise, Sany, a Chinese multinational heavy
equipment manufacturing company, reportedly makes most of its

34

Id. at 657 (citing Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors
USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1307–10 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 658.
38
Id.
39
Id. As to the remaining 23% of sales, the jury found no direct infringement at trial.
Verdict Form at 1, Lake Cherokee Hard Drive Techs., L.L.C. v. Marvell Semiconductor,
Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 653, 658 (E.D. Tex. 2013) (No. 2:10-cv-216-JRG).
40
Friedrich Wu et al., Dos and Don’ts for Chinese Companies Investing in the United
States: Lessons from Huawei and Haier, 53(4) THUNDERBIRD INT’L BUS. REV. 501, 507
(2011) (“Huawei…in 2010 alone, spent US $6.1 billion purchasing products and services
from American companies…. In contrast, its annual sales in the United States were just US
$400 million in the same period. This also pales in comparison to its sales in other regions.
It is interesting to note that Huawei has managed to secure second place in the world
telecom market without substantial business in the world’s largest market, the United
States.”).
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revenue in China.41 Apple also makes the majority of its total net
sales outside the U.S.42 Lake Cherokee illustrates the value of a successful foreign sales defense to such companies. There, 77% of the
defendant’s sales of the accused chips were carved from the damages base and excluded from presentation to the jury at trial because
the underlying sales activities had occurred outside the U.S. 43 This
effectively reduced the defendant’s damages exposure in that U.S.based patent case by 77%.
A finding by the court that all or a substantial percentage of a
company’s sales-related activities occurred outside the U.S. and
therefore do not infringe can be case dispositive or, at the very least,
highly advantageous to the company in settlement negotiations.
Excluding foreign sales may significantly reduce the damages base,
which is the total amount of sales of the allegedly infringing product
during the relevant time period.44 In turn, this can significantly limit
the size of the damages pool presented to the jury at trial. It can also
encourage a more favorable settlement for the company, as the
plaintiff’s ability to collect a large damages award will likely be
severely limited by the confinement of damages to domestic sales.
As Lake Cherokee demonstrates, a potentially case dispositive
strategy for companies with entirely or predominantly foreign sales
is to move for summary judgment of non-infringement with respect
to those sales that occur abroad. As in Lake Cherokee, these motions
are most likely to be granted where the “substantial activities” of the
sales transactions at issue, such as the submission and acceptance of
purchase orders, manufacturing, and delivery, take place outside the
U.S., and the products at issue do not later enter into the U.S.

41

Nin-Hai Tseng, Sany’s Bold U.S. Move, FORTUNE (June 17, 2013, 9:00 AM)
https://fortune.com/2013/06/17/sanys-bold-u-s-move/ [https://perma.cc/UK6R-7SQD].
42
Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 5 (Sept. 28, 2019) (“[Apple] has
international operations with sales outside the U.S. representing a majority of the
Company’s total net sales. In addition, a majority of [Apple’s] supply chain, and its
manufacturing and assembly activities, are located outside the U.S.”).
43
Lake Cherokee, 964 F. Supp. 2d at 658.
44
KAREN VOGEL WEIL ET AL., DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY FEES, §§ 9:1.2, 9–5 (2017),
https://legacy.pli.edu/product_files/Titles/159/%23208897_09_Patent_Litigation_P3_201
70915135404.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5TM-BWDG].
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2. MediaTek v. Freescale
In MediaTek Inc. v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., however, the
defendant, Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. (“Freescale”), was unsuccessful in arguing that a subset of its chips did not infringe because
they were manufactured abroad, sold to manufacturers abroad, and
incorporated by the manufacturers into Amazon Kindle products
abroad.45 Freescale’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement as to its foreign activities was therefore denied. 46
Freescale was a U.S. company that provided applications processors.47 In 2009, Freescale entered into a “Freescale Standard
Sales Agreement” (“Agreement”) with Amazon Fulfillment Services, Inc. (“AFS”), a U.S.-based subsidiary of Amazon.com (“Amazon”), which is in turn a U.S. corporation.48 The negotiations leading up to the Agreement and the execution of the Agreement took
place in the U.S.49 The Agreement governed all sales of Freescale’s
chips to AFS and its “Authorized Purchasers” and “Designees,”50
and stated that “Freescale will sell to Authorized Purchasers, and
Authorized Purchasers will buy from Freescale, products from time
to time.”51 In addition, the Agreement identified Lab126, a U.S.based division of Amazon, as the “Buyer” of Freescale’s products.52
The Agreement identified prices in an attachment and stated in
the “Prices” term that Freescale would not provide any “Designee”
with “any rebates, discounts, free Product, kick-back or other similar
terms related directly or indirectly to the Product supplied to any
Designees under this Agreement without Buyer’s express, prior
written consent.”53 The Designees could be foreign companies, such
as Foxconn, a Taiwanese multinational electronics contract manufacturer.54 Moreover, subject to one exception, the Agreement
45

MediaTek Inc. v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., No. 11-cv-5341 YGR, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18640, at *2–3, *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2014).
46
Id. at *3.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at *4.
51
Id.
52
Id. at *3.
53
Id. at *4.
54
Id. at *5, *12.
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provided that “each time an Authorized Purchaser wishes to purchase Product(s) from Freescale, the Authorized Purchaser must
submit to Freescale a written purchase order.” 55
Freescale argued that the chips that were manufactured outside
the U.S., sold to manufacturers outside the U.S., and incorporated
by those manufacturers into Amazon Kindles outside the U.S., and
thus could not qualify as infringing products because these manufacturing, selling, and incorporating activities occurred extraterritorially.56 The court disagreed, finding that there were triable issues of
fact from which a reasonable jury could conclude that “sales” of or
“offers to sell” the chips had taken place in the U.S.57 In particular,
the Agreement between Freescale and AFS specifically identified
AFS as the “Buyer” and Freescale as the “Seller”58 and governed all
product purchases made by AFS and its Authorized Purchasers and
Designees from Freescale.59 As a result, although Foxconn, for example, received the accused applications processor products in
China for incorporation in Amazon Kindles that had also been manufactured in China, Foxconn was purchasing these applications processors pursuant to the Agreement. 60 Moreover, the delegation of
authority from AFS to the Authorized Purchasers to issue purchase
orders to Freescale did nothing to change the fact that every sale
arising out of those purchase orders was subject to the terms and
conditions of the Agreement.61 In addition, AFS directly controlled
the pricing terms and restrictions for all Authorized Purchasers and

55

Id.
Id.
57
Id. at *3, *12; see also id. at *7–9 (noting that cases determining whether a sale or
offer for sale have occurred for purposes of Section 271(a) have considered factors such as
the location of a contemplated future sale, the location of delivery, the location of
performance, the location of the negotiation of the sales contract, and the location of the
execution of the sales contract) (citing Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v.
Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010); MEMC Elec.
Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Fellowes, Inc. v. Michilin Prosperity Co., Ltd., 491 F. Supp. 2d 571, 577 (E.D. Va. 2007);
3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Wing Shing
Prods. (BVI), Ltd. v. Simatelex Mfg. Co., Ltd., 479 F. Supp. 2d 388, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
58
MediaTek, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18640, at *9.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at *10.
56
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Designees and had expressly restricted Freescale’s ability to directly
negotiate with those Authorized Purchasers and Designees. 62 The
Plaintiff had also proffered evidence showing that the chips were
paid for by U.S.-based Lab126 and that Lab126 was identified as the
customer for the chips.63
Based on these facts, the court concluded that the Agreement
controlled the sales and sales terms of all purchases and provided
tangible evidence of a sales relationship between two U.S. companies.64 As a result, the court could not find as a matter of law that
the sales were not U.S. sales under Section 271(a) and denied Freescale’s motion for summary judgment.65
In several respects, the facts of MediaTek were very similar to
those in Lake Cherokee. In both cases, the defendants were U.S.based chip suppliers that had entered into supply agreements with
their customers; the supply agreements were negotiated and executed in the U.S.; the defendants’ customers were required to submit
purchase orders to purchase the products at issue; and the products
were manufactured and delivered to the customers outside the U.S.
Why did the foreign sales argument largely succeed in Lake Cherokee but not in MediaTek?
The critical difference is that the sales in MediaTek, including
those made pursuant to the purchase orders, were governed by the
terms and conditions of the Agreement between Freescale and AFS.
The parties to the Agreement were two U.S. companies and it was
U.S.-based Freescale itself that received and processed the purchase
orders for the products at issue.66 Further, there was evidence that
Lab126, a U.S. company based in the U.S., was the customer and
paid for the products.67 These facts were sufficient to raise an issue

62

Id. at *9 (noting that the Agreement stated that Freescale would not provide any
“rebates, discounts, free Product, kick-back or other similar terms related directly or
indirectly to the Product supplied to any Designees under this Agreement without Buyer’s
express, prior written consent”).
63
Id. at *9–10.
64
Id. at *11–12 (distinguishing Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Eng’g, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d
1173 (D. Nev. 2011) as involving only “some pricing discussions”).
65
Id. at *12.
66
Id. at *3, *5.
67
Id. at *9–10.
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of material fact about whether Freescale’s activities rose to the level
of sales within the U.S., thereby defeating its motion for summary
judgment of non-infringement. In contrast, in Lake Cherokee, it was
the purchase orders submitted abroad by customers outside the U.S.
to a third-party Singaporean company based in Singapore that governed the sales at issue.
MediaTek and Lake Cherokee demonstrate the impact that variations in the terms and conditions of supply agreements and the
structures of sales transactions can have on a foreign sales defense.
Although the two cases shared a number of foundational facts, including that the manufacturing and delivery of the products at issue
occurred outside the U.S., they were ultimately decided very differently.68 In determining whether to implement an extraterritoriality
defense at the summary judgment stage, companies should review
their sales agreements, sales transactions, and business practices to
determine whether these agreements, transactions, and practices are
so sufficiently tied to the U.S. that they may raise material issues of
fact about whether the company’s sales activities have occurred
within the U.S.
3. McGinley v. Luv N’ Care
The two cases discussed above, Lake Cherokee and MediaTek,
demonstrate the potential value of a foreign sales defense at the summary judgment stage of a patent infringement case. However, a foreign sales defense can and should be put into action even earlier in
the case—specifically, during the initial investigation and discovery
phases. In U.S. litigations, discovery is a pre-trial procedure that
allows the parties to obtain evidence from each other relating to the
claims and defenses in the case.69 If the plaintiff is unable to obtain
documents or other information about the defendant’s foreign sales
activities during the discovery process, the potential damages figure

68

See Lake Cherokee Hard Drive Techs., L.L.C. v. Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 964
F. Supp. 2d 653, 657–58 (granting partial summary judgment that 77% of the defendant’s
sales of chips did not occur within the U.S.); MediaTek, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18640, at
*2–3, *5 (denying motion for summary judgment of non-infringement as to the defendant’s
foreign activities).
69
The Harvard L. Rev. Ass’n, Developments in the Law — Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV.
942, 942 (1961).
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will effectively be limited to the defendant’s domestic sales. As
such, discovery can be critical in a patent litigation. The next case
relates to discovery proceedings.
In McGinley v. Luv N’ Care, Ltd., the court granted-in-part a
motion to compel discovery of the defendant’s foreign sales activities.70 As a result, the defendant was ordered to provide interrogatory responses and produce documents concerning those activities.71
Among other things, the Plaintiff, S.C. Products, Inc. (“SCP”),
had sought information and documents concerning Defendant Luv
N’ Care, Ltd.’s (“LNC”) use, sale, and offers to sell its Nuby72 TearFree Rinse Pail products,73 regardless of where those sales had occurred.74 In its discovery responses, LNC had objected to SCP’s
document requests as seeking documents concerning only activity
taking place outside of the U.S.75 LNC had also objected to providing information about its distributors, global partners, and commissions, royalties, and revenues earned outside the U.S. and the sale,
delivery, and distribution of those of its accused rinse pail products
that were not made, used, sold, offered for sale, or imported into
the U.S.76
In opposing the motion to compel, LNC argued that the activities
of third parties who operated abroad and did not manufacture, use,
sell, or offer for sale any of the rinse pail products at issue within
the U.S. or import these products into the U.S. was irrelevant to any
claim or defense in the case.77 LNC asserted that it did not have any
foreign distributors, was not involved in any transactions between

70

McGinley v. Luv N’ Care, No. Civ. A. 17-0821, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229475, at
*1, *8–9 (W.D. La. Sept. 10, 2018) (citing Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 831 F.3d
1369, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807
F.3d 1283, 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
71
Id. at *12–19.
72
LNC and Nuby are the same thing. Id. at *14.
73
The Nuby Tear-Free Rinse Pail product is typically used for rinsing shampoo out of a
baby’s hair while keeping water and soap out of the baby’s face and eyes. See Nuby TearFree Rinse Pail, NUBY, available at https://www.nuby.com/usa/en/tear-free-rinse-pail-1-2
[https://perma.cc/56UU-TWFD].
74
McGinley, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229475, at *2.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at *7.
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foreign manufacturers and foreign distributors, had no records of
such transactions, did not receive any payments when purchases occurred directly from Chinese factories, and did not receive royalties
or license payments from any foreign entities.78 LNC argued that
because the U.S. patent laws do not apply extraterritorially, these
third-party foreign activities did not constitute infringement and
were not relevant to the case.79
However, LNC’s deposition testimony and that of its officers
contradicted its claims.80 Specifically, LNC’s CEO and President
had testified that LNC sold its products in 155 countries using distributors across the globe, had 15-20 distributors for international
sales, had distribution agreements with international distributors,
and received commissions from distributors under those distribution
agreements.81 In addition, LNC’s CFO testified that international
distributors who wanted to order a product had to use LNC’s “Luv
N’ Care Internet Ordering System” (“LIOS”), which tracked all international sales and had its servers located in Louisiana.82 Further,
LNC testified that international distributors purchased its products,
including the rinse pail products at issue in the case, directly from
overseas factories which, until 2015, would send their profits to an
LNC affiliate in Florida.83 Although profits from foreign sales were
subsequently sent to a company in Hong Kong, LNC’s distributors
in some countries would still send profits to the Florida affiliate because of governmental regulations.84 And, LNC had the ability to
withdraw funds from the Hong Kong account and bring such funds
to the U.S.85 Finally, LNC’s CEO testified that he negotiated with
foreign manufacturers the cost of production for LNC’s products
and the rate per unit that distributors paid to the factory. 86

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Id. at *7, *9.
Id.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *10–11.
Id. at *11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *11–12.
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The court found that this deposition testimony showed that LNC
was indeed involved in many aspects of the sales between the foreign manufacturers and foreign distributors and, thus, that this
activity was relevant to the claims and defenses in the case. 87 While
LNC’s activities might not ultimately infringe under the U.S. patent
laws, the court reasoned that SCP was nevertheless entitled to discover the extent to which LNC had engaged in foreign sales activities and whether sales of the accused rinse pail products had occurred within the U.S.88
The court therefore ordered LNC to provide interrogatory responses that identified the distributors and global partners to or
through which the accused rinse pail products were sold, delivered,
or distributed to;89 that described the methods by which LNC received commissions, royalties, or revenue from related transactions;90 and that provided the dates, price, location, and profits for
the production, purchase, and sale of the rinse pails.91 The court also
ordered LNC to produce documents relating to transactions involving the accused rinse pail products.92 As the court saw it, the information and documents were relevant because LNC’s deposition testimony had indicated that it did, in fact, use and work with foreign
distributors and was involved in various aspects of the international
transactions, including forming distribution agreements, negotiating
prices with factories, maintaining a product order system, and receiving commissions.93 Further, LNC had waived its objections to
providing information about foreign sales activity in response to
certain interrogatories by failing to raise those objections in its initial
responses to those interrogatories and failing to address those interrogatories in its opposition to the motion to compel. 94

87

Id. at *12.
Id.
89
Id. at *15.
90
Id.
91
Id. at *16–17.
92
Id. at *17–18.
93
Id. at *15–18.
94
Id. at *16–17 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)); see Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc. v. Yang Kun
“Michael” Chung, 325 F.R.D. 578, 591 (N.D. Tex. 2017); Henderson v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., No. CV 15-0669, 2016 WL 5936889, at *1 (W.D. La. Oct. 11, 2016).
88
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As part of the initial investigation at the outset of a case, the
company should conduct a review of its internal and external documents and interview its employees to determine whether, and to
what extent, its activities are subject to the U.S. patent laws. The
company should review its sales, marketing, accounting, and financial documents and communications to determine the viability of a
foreign sales defense. This could include supply agreements, quotations, purchase orders, shipping confirmations, invoices, sales-related emails with customers, website order forms, press releases,
news articles, and marketing efforts at trade shows and conferences.
The company should also interview employees who are intimately
involved in and knowledgeable about its sales processes and any
distinctions between its domestic and foreign sales cycles. This initial review will not only aid in preparing high-level liability and
damages strategies, but is also key to ensuring that positions taken
by the company during discovery on its domestic and foreign sales
cycles are consistent. As McGinley demonstrates, conflicting testimony and documents can be harmful to a foreign sales defense.
There, it was LNC’s own deposition testimony that sank its opposition to the plaintiff’s motion to compel foreign sales discovery. 95
Once discovery begins, the pace picks up. The burden and expense of discovery in U.S. litigations can be astronomical, particularly in patent litigations.96 Each party to a case may obtain discovery on any non-privileged matter, so long as the discovery sought is
relevant to the claims and/or defenses in the case and proportional
to the needs of the case.97 Companies with significant sales and manufacturing operations outside the U.S. should therefore make best
efforts to limit discovery to their domestic activities as soon as the
discovery phase begins.

95

McGinley, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229475, at *9–12.
Randall R. Rader, The State of Patent Litigation, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 331, 336 (2012)
(“Every person in this room understands that the greatest weakness of the U.S. court system
is its expense. And the driving factor for that expense is discovery excesses…. Patent cases,
in particular, produce disproportionately high discovery expenses. In one 2010 report, the
Federal Judicial Center determined that IP cases had costs ‘almost 62% higher, all else
equal.’”).
97
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
96
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This can reduce the drain that discovery typically imposes on the
company’s resources. It can also aid in minimizing the distractions
on a company’s business operations that would otherwise be caused
by litigation. For example, limiting discovery to only those products
that are sold in the U.S. can limit the number of employees who
could be called for deposition and therefore be required to spend
time away from their jobs to prepare and sit for their depositions. In
terms of the opportunity cost to the company’s business, the time
spent by these employees on depositions can be significant. Deposition attendance can also be costly and inconvenient for witnesses
who spend much of their time outside the U.S., such as at sales or
manufacturing facilities in China. As another example, limiting discovery to domestic activities may limit the volume of documents
that must be collected, reviewed, and produced to only those documents concerning the company’s domestic sales. For companies that
conduct all or a majority of their sales outside the U.S., this reduction can be significant. For Chinese companies requiring English
translations of Chinese documents or interpreter services during the
depositions of Chinese employees, this reduction in expenses can be
even more significant.
However, the plaintiff in a patent case will rarely agree that discovery should be so limited. Patent defendants would therefore be
well-served by taking an aggressive approach to confining discovery to their domestic activities. For example, defendants should raise
and preserve their objections to discovery of foreign sales activities
early during the discovery phase of the case for resolution in a motion to compel. It is critical to affirmatively object to the discovery
of foreign activities by expressly stating those objections in response
to discovery requests and to expressly address these objections in
opposing a plaintiff’s motion to compel, as a failure to do so can
result in waiver of those objections. In McGinley, for example, the
defendant, LNC, was deemed to have waived its objections to
providing information about its foreign sales activities in response
to certain interrogatories because it had failed to raise objections
to foreign sales discovery in its initial responses and failed to
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address the interrogatories in its opposition to the plaintiff’s motion
to compel.98
Proactive discovery practices, such as early and voluntary document productions, can also be used as effective tools to advance a
foreign sales defense. But, it is important to recognize that discovery
is much more limited in Chinese courts than in the U.S.99 In fact,
there is no “U.S.-style” discovery in China and, as a result, plaintiffs
in Chinese litigations are required to collect and produce their own
evidence to prove patent infringement and damages. 100 Chinese
defendants may not therefore be accustomed to providing confidential, proprietary, or sensitive information for U.S. litigations.
Nevertheless, it can be advantageous for these companies to produce documents that show the distinction between their foreign and
domestic sales transactions early on in discovery. Early document
productions can effectively delineate between company sales that
may be subject to the U.S. patent laws, and those that may not. Ideally, this would foreclose expensive and time-consuming discovery
geared at delineating between foreign and domestic sales, and conclusively show that the company’s foreign sales are irrelevant to the
plaintiff’s U.S. patent claims. In doing so, the company may be able
to carve out its foreign sales from the liability and damages determinations at an early stage in the case. This would likely not only
reduce discovery expenses going forward but also lay the foundation
for an early and favorable settlement of the case.

98

McGinley, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229475, at *16–17.
J. Benjamin Bai et al., What Multinational Companies Need to Know About Patent
Invalidation and Patent Litigation in China, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 449, 459
(2007).
100
Id.
99
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II. “OFFERS TO SELL” WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

A. Legal Framework
An “offer to sell” under Section 271(a) is an offer that contemplates a sale that will take place in the U.S.101 In defining “offers to
sell” under the statute, courts implement a traditional contract analysis.102 Under general contract principles, an offer to sell occurs
when one party communicates a willingness to enter into a transaction such that another party would understand that it has been invited
to partake in the transaction.103 For example, a description of a patented product or service and the price at which it may be purchased
could qualify as an offer to sell.104
Unlike a sale, an offer to sell does not need to be accepted to
qualify as an act of infringement.105 Further, it is the location of the
contemplated sale, not the offer, that determines whether an offer to
sell has occurred within the U.S. under Section 271(a). 106 Therefore,
it is not enough for an offer to be made in the U.S.;107 rather, an offer
to sell would only qualify as infringement if the offer were to sell a
patented invention with the sale occurring in the U.S.108
B. Case Studies
1. Halo v. Pulse
In Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of

101

Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Tex.
Advanced Optoelectronic Sols., Inc. v. Renesas Elecs. Am., Inc., 895 F.3d 1304, 1330 n.12
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
102
Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1254–55 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
103
Halo, 769 F.3d at 1381 (quoting MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials
Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
104
Id. (quoting 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
1998)).
105
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617
F.3d 1296, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
106
Id. at 1309.
107
Tex. Advanced Optoelectronic Sol. Inc. v. Renesas Elecs. Am. Inc., 895 F.3d 1304,
1330 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
108
Halo, 769 F.3d at 1381 (quoting Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309).
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no direct infringement by the defendant’s accused products that
were manufactured, shipped, and delivered outside the U.S. 109
The issue in Halo was whether the defendant’s activities qualified as infringing sales or offers to sell within the U.S. The defendant, Pulse Electronics, Inc. (“Pulse”), designed, manufactured, and
sold the accused surface mount electronic packages in Asia, with
manufacturing taking place exclusively in China.110 Although Pulse
delivered some of these electronic packages to customers in the
U.S., most of its products were delivered to customers outside the
U.S.111 These foreign customers included contract manufacturers
for U.S.-based companies.112 The contract manufacturers incorporated surface mount electronic package products supplied by Pulse
into end products, such as internet routers manufactured for U.S.
companies, which were then sold and shipped to customers worldwide, including to customers in the U.S.113 Pulse received purchase
orders for all products delivered abroad at its sales offices outside
the U.S.114
In affirming summary judgment of no direct infringement, the
Federal Circuit held that Pulse had not sold or offered to sell within
the U.S. the accused electronic packages that were otherwise manufactured, shipped, and delivered outside the U.S.115 As an initial
matter, the products did not enter the U.S. at any point. 116 Further,
Pulse received the purchase orders for the products abroad. 117 Thus,
the Federal Circuit reasoned, the sales transactions did not qualify
as domestic sales because the substantial activities of these transactions occurred outside the U.S.118 Nor did these transactions qualify

109

Id. at 1374.
Id. at 1375; Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Eng’g, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1207 (D.
Nev. 2011).
111
Halo, 769 F.3d at 1375.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 1374.
116
Id. at 1379 (citing Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Eng’g, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1207
(D. Nev. 2011).
117
Id.
118
Id.
110
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as domestic offers to sell, given that the locations of the sales contemplated by the offers lay outside the U.S.119
Yet, Pulse had conducted certain activities in the U.S. Specifically, Pulse had entered into a general business agreement 120 with at
least one U.S. customer, Cisco, and had engaged in quarterly pricing
negotiations with Cisco.121 These activities did not qualify as sales
within the U.S. because the general business agreement was not a
contract to buy or sell any specific products and the pricing negotiations did not constitute firm or binding agreements on either Pulse
or Cisco to buy and sell any such products.122 Rather, it was the purchase orders that Pulse received from Cisco’s foreign contract manufacturers, including Hon-Hai Precision Co. (Foxconn), that established the essential terms, including price and quantity, of binding
contracts to buy and sell.123 In addition, it was Cisco’s foreign contract manufacturers, and not Cisco, who paid Pulse upon fulfillment
of these purchase orders.124 In sum, these domestic activities were
insufficient to constitute either a sale or an offer to sell within the
U.S. for purposes of Section 271(a). 125
In cases reaching the dispositive motion stage, foreign companies with significant sales activities outside the U.S. should move
for summary judgment of non-infringement with respect to their foreign sales activities. The same applies to companies that outsource
their manufacturing to foreign countries, such as China, and perform
the substantial activities of their sales transactions abroad. With
much of the world’s manufacturing taking place in China and with

119

Id. at 1381.
The general business agreement specified manufacturing capacity, low price
warranty, and lead time terms, but did not refer to any specific products or prices. Id. at
1375.
121
Pulse additionally conducted pricing negotiations in the U.S. with American
companies; met regularly with design engineers for American companies; sent product
samples to American companies in the U.S.; attended sales meetings with customers in the
U.S.; and provided post-sale support for customers in the U.S. Id.
122
Id. at 1379.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 1375–76, 1379.
125
Id. at 1379.
120
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the rise in manufactured exports from China, 126 it is not uncommon
for companies of this variety to implement sales transactions similar
to those in Halo.
For Chinese companies and those who do business with them,
motions for summary judgment arguing that the products or services
at issue do not qualify as infringing sales or offers to sell are more
likely to be granted where, as in Halo, purchase orders are submitted
and received outside the U.S.;127 the products at issue are manufactured, shipped, and delivered outside the U.S.; 128 and the products
never enter the U.S.129 A finding by the court that these sales and
offers to sell do not infringe, as in Halo, can be instrumental in
securing a favorable settlement.
2. SignalQuest v. Tien-Ming Chou
In SignalQuest, Inc. v. Tien-Ming Chou, the defendants moved
for summary judgment that their activities did not qualify as infringing sales or offers to sell within the U.S.130 The plaintiff admitted
that there had been no domestic sales of the accused products, but
maintained that the defendants had nonetheless offered to sell the
products within the U.S.131 The court agreed with the plaintiff and
denied the defendants’ motion with respect to the offers to sell. 132
In this case, the plaintiff, SignalQuest, Inc. (“SignalQuest”),
asserted three related patents on omnidirectional tilt and vibration
sensor technology against the defendants, Tien-Ming Chou,
OncQue Corporation, and Bravotronics Corporation (collectively,
“Defendants”).133 The Defendants moved for summary judgment
following reissuance of the asserted patents in October 2014, 134
126

KEVIN H. ZHANG, CHINA’S DOMESTIC TRANSFORMATION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 297
(Ligang Song et al. eds., 15th ed. 2015) (“As a factory to the world, China is also the
world’s number one producer of manufactured goods and manufactured exports.”).
127
Halo, 769 F.3d at 1379.
128
Id. at 1374.
129
Id. at 1379.
130
SignalQuest, Inc. v. Tien-Ming Chou, No. Civ. A. 11-cv-392-JL, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21749, at *4 (D.N.H. Feb. 23, 2016).
131
Id. at *5.
132
Id. at *2, *5.
133
Id. at *3.
134
Id. at *4.
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arguing that they had not sold or offered to sell the accused sensor
products in the U.S. after the patents reissued. 135 SignalQuest conceded that there had been no sales of the accused products in the
U.S., but maintained that the Defendants had offered these products
for sale in the U.S. on at least two occasions after the patents’ reissuance.136 Specifically, SignalQuest pointed to two quotations for
sale of the Defendants’ accused sensor product: one quotation sent
to a North Carolina-based company in approximately November
2014137 and one quotation sent to a Texas-based company on or
around March 25, 2015.138 The Defendants admitted that both quotations had been sent, but argued that neither of the quotations could
qualify as an infringing offer to sell; and, moreover, even if they did,
neither offer could infringe because neither had been made “within
the United States.”139
The court disagreed.140 First, there was a material issue of fact
about whether the quotations were “offers for sale” under Section
271(a).141 Although neither of the quotations specified a quantity,
each identified the accused sensor product and a price per unit for
the product that varied based only on the purchaser’s desired volume.142 As the Federal Circuit had found, price quotations could
qualify as offers to sell under Section 271(a) “based on the substance
conveyed in the letters, i.e., a description of the allegedly infringing
merchandise and the price at which it can be purchased.” 143 Thus, a
reasonable jury could interpret the November 2014 and March 2015
quotations as offers to sell.144
In addition, it was immaterial that the March 2015 quotation
required customers to select one of two proposed products and could
135

Id. at *5.
Id.
137
Id. at *5 n.5.
138
Id. at *5–6.
139
Id.
140
Id. at *7–8.
141
Id. at *7–9.
142
Id. at *7–8.
143
Id. at *8 (quoting 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)).
144
Id. (quoting MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420
F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
136
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therefore allow the purchase of non-accused products only.145 What
mattered was that the customer could decide to order the accused
product based on the quotation and, as with the November 2014 quotation, do so by specifying only the quantity it desired to purchase. 146
Second, there were material issues of fact about whether the
sales contemplated by the November 2014 and March 2015 offers
would have taken place “within the United States.”147 Here, the Defendants argued that neither quotation was an offer within the U.S.
because the quotations contemplated transfer of title in Taiwan and
the real purchaser under the November 2014 quotation might be a
contract manufacturer in China.148 The court rejected these arguments, first reasoning that the location of a sale is not limited to the
location where legal title is transferred.149 A “f.o.b.” or “ex works”
term in an offer for sale would therefore not conclusively establish
that the contemplated sale would occur outside the U.S. 150 Further,
there were several issues of material fact about the location of delivery for sales contemplated by the offers. 151 The March 2015 quotation stated “Departure: TW Taiwan” and “Designation: US United
States.”152 At minimum, this evidence showed that delivery of the
accused products had been contemplated to take place from Taiwan
and into the U.S.153 In addition, it was not clear whether the real
purchaser of the November 2014 quotation was actually a contract
manufacturer in China or whether the parties had contemplated
delivery of products to North Carolina or another location within
the U.S.154
Taking all of these circumstances together, the court concluded
that there were issues of material fact about whether the Defendants
had offered to sell the accused products within the U.S.
145

Id.
Id. at *8–9.
147
Id. at *9–11.
148
Id. at *9.
149
Id. at *10 (citing Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2014)).
150
Id.
151
Id. at *10–11.
152
Id. at *10.
153
Id. at *10–11.
154
Id. at *11.
146
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after the patents had reissued. 155 The court therefore denied
summary judgment.156
Many companies use quotations at the relatively early stages of
a sales cycle. For example, Alibaba, a Chinese multinational company specializing in e-commerce and technology, has a “Request for
Quotation” form on its website that potential customers can fill out
and submit online to request custom quotations from various suppliers.157 However, as SignalQuest illustrates, there are potential issues
that price quotations can bring to a company’s foreign sales defense.
Although quotations tend to be used at the nascent stages of a sales
transaction and may not ultimately result in the consummation of a
sale, they may rise to the level of an infringing offer to sell within
the U.S. under certain circumstances.
As in SignalQuest, a price quotation may be considered an “offer
to sell” if it identifies an allegedly infringing product and the price
at which that product can be purchased pursuant to the quotation—
even if the customer could theoretically select and purchase other,
non-accused products identified on the price quotation.158 After all,
all that the customer needs to do in order to accept the offer is to
select the quantity of the allegedly infringing product that it wishes
to purchase.159 As a result, companies that provide price quotations
of this nature may be less successful in moving for summary
judgment of non-infringement.
SignalQuest also shows that these types of price quotations may
be considered offers to sell “within the United States” if they
indicate that the delivery of allegedly infringing products pursuant
to the quotation will take place in the U.S.160 In SignalQuest, the
mere identification of the U.S. as the shipment destination on the
March 2015 quotation was enough to raise an issue of material fact
about whether the offer had taken place in the U.S.161 In fact, it was
155

Id. at *2.
Id. at *11.
157
Request for Quotation, ALIBABA, https://rfq.alibaba.com/ [https://perma.cc/4Q9GE3TE].
158
SignalQuest, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21749, at *7–9.
159
Id. at *7–8.
160
Id. at *9–11.
161
Id.
156
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insufficient that the transfer of title would take place outside the U.S.
and that the real purchaser “may” be a contract manufacturer in
China to eliminate the material issue of fact arising out of the quotation’s identification of the U.S. as the shipment destination.162
In contrast, recall that the purchase orders in Halo were found not
to be infringing offers to sell because the locations of the sales
contemplated by the purchase orders were outside the U.S.163
Under circumstances similar to those in SignalQuest, courts may be
reluctant to grant summary judgment of non-infringement with regard to the company’s price quotations. Nevertheless, it is important
to note that any factual issues that prevent a summary judgment
ruling of non-infringement can still be resolved in the defendant’s
favor at trial.
III. INDUCED INFRINGEMENT

A. Legal Framework
Parts II and III of this Article examined two forms of direct infringement, namely, sales and offers to sell patented inventions
within the U.S. This Article now turns to indirect infringement, and
specifically, induced infringement.164
The induced infringement provision of the U.S. Patent Act, 35
U.S.C. § 271(b) (“Section 271(b)”), states as follows:
“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”165
To prove induced infringement, a patentee must show two
things: first, that there has been direct infringement, and second, that
the alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement and had specific intent to encourage another’s infringement.166 One who

162

Id. at *10–11.
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
164
35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
165
Id.
166
MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294,
1304–05 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see also Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech
163
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induces infringement is jointly and severally liable with the direct
infringer for all general damages arising out of the infringement. 167
To satisfy the knowledge requirement of induced infringement,
there must be both knowledge of the existence of the patent and
knowledge that the induced acts are infringing. 168 The knowledge
requirement can be satisfied by showing either actual knowledge or
willful blindness.169 Willful blindness requires that alleged infringer
subjectively believes that there is a high probability that a fact exists
and take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact. 170 That is,
a defendant is willfully blind if it takes deliberate actions to avoid
confirming a high probability of wrongdoing—to the point where it
can almost be deemed to have actually known of the critical fact. 171
On the other hand, deliberate indifference to a known risk of infringement is insufficient to establish knowledge or willful blindness.172
With regard to the intent requirement, knowledge of possible infringement by others is insufficient to prove the requisite intent.173
Rather, a patentee must prove specific intent and action to induce
the infringement.174 Circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to
prove intent, and as such, direct evidence is not required to prove
this element of an induced infringement claim. 175

Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Inducement only
occurs if the party being induced directly infringes the patent.”).
167
Crystal Semiconductor, 246 F.3d at 1361.
168
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 765–66 (2011)).
169
Global-Tech, 563 U.S. at 766–68.
170
Id. at 769.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 770 (“The test applied by the Federal Circuit in this case departs from the proper
willful blindness standard in two important respects. First, it permits a finding of
knowledge when there is merely a ‘known risk’ that the induced acts are infringing.
Second, in demanding only ‘deliberate indifference’ to that risk, the Federal Circuit’s test
does not require active efforts by an inducer to avoid knowing about the infringing nature
of the activities.”).
173
DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
174
Id. at 1305 (citation omitted).
175
MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.3d 660, 668 (Fed.
Cir. 1988)).
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B. Case Studies
1. Largan v. Genius
In Largan Precision Co., Ltd. v. Genius Elec. Optical Co., Ltd.,
the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issues
of direct, induced, and contributory infringement.176 The motions
focused on whether the defendant’s conduct was sufficiently tied to
the U.S. to give rise to liability for patent infringement. 177 The court
found that although the defendant’s accused products met the elements of the asserted patent claims, almost all of the accused conduct had taken place beyond the territorial reach of the U.S. patent
laws.178 The court therefore granted-in-part and denied-in-part the
motions for summary judgment, resulting in a significantly favorable outcome for the defendant.179
The plaintiff, Largan Precision Co., Ltd. (“Largan”), and defendant, Genius Electronics Optical Co., Ltd. (“Genius”), a Taiwanese company, supplied lenses to Apple and Motorola that were eventually incorporated into cellphones and tablets. 180 With regard to
Apple, Genius and Apple had entered into a Master Development
and Supply Agreement (“MDSA”) that governed the sale of products from Genius to “Apple and Apple Affiliates.”181 The MDSA
did not specify any lens prices, quantities, or models to be sold.182
Genius’s employees negotiated prices with Apple’s employees in
the U.S., after which Apple sometimes provided Genius with a
Statement of Work (“SOW”).183 SOWs included information such
as the code name of the relevant lens, a maximum price, and a minimum quantity of lenses to be sold.184 Genius then quoted the prices

176

Largan Precision Co., Ltd. v. Genius Elec. Optical Co., Ltd., 86 F. Supp. 3d 1105,
1107 (N.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 646 F. App’x 946 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The issue of contributory
infringement is beyond the scope of this article and is therefore not discussed in this section.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id. at 1107, 1113.
181
Id. at 1108.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 1108–09.
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to camera module integrators located in Asia. 185 In turn, the camera
module integrators sent purchase orders to Genius at its headquarters in Taichung, Taiwan or its manufacturing facilities in Xiamen,
China.186 Genius then shipped the lenses from Xiamen, China to
camera module integrators, which incorporated the lenses into cameras and sold the cameras to system integrators located in Asia. 187
Finally, the system integrators incorporated the cameras into cellphones and tablets and sent these devices to Apple to be sold to consumers in various countries, including the U.S. 188
Genius followed a similar sales process for lenses incorporated
into Motorola products.189 Genius’s employees negotiated prices
with Motorola’s U.S.-based employees through a three-stage process: Genius gave Motorola a range of potentially acceptable prices,
Motorola requested a more granular price proposal from Genius, and
the parties negotiated a mutually agreeable price.190 Genius then
sold its lenses to a module integrator at the agreed-upon price, after
which the lenses moved through Motorola’s supply chain in a similar manner to Apple’s supply chain. 191 This process also took place
entirely in Asia.192
The vast majority of the accused lenses and lens/sensor combinations were sold through the supply chains described above. 193 Notably, however, Genius supplied a small number of the accused lens
products directly to Apple in the U.S. through FedEx or DHL. 194
These lenses were provided as free development samples at Apple’s
request and according to Apple’s instructions.195
Although the Apple and Motorola supply chains terminated in
the U.S., among other countries, the court concluded that most of
Genius’s accused lenses had not been sold or offered for sale within
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195

Id. at 1109.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the U.S.196 The transactions were not sales within the U.S. because
the Apple and Motorola supply chains were analogous to the supply
chain in Halo.197 As in Halo, Genius had manufactured its lenses in
Asia in response to purchase orders submitted and paid for by foreign module integrators outside the U.S. 198 In addition, although Genius had conducted high-level contract and pricing negotiations with
Apple and Motorola in the U.S., the majority of the activities underlying the disputed sales transactions had taken place outside the
U.S.199 Moreover, the MDSA governing Genius’s sales to Apple and
the SOWs issued by Apple with maximum prices and minimum
quantities for specific products were akin to the general business
agreement and quarterly pricing negotiations for specific products,
respectively, that had been deemed insufficient to qualify as sales
within the U.S. in Halo.200
Additionally, the transactions were not offers to sell within the
U.S. because the sales that were the subject of any such offers took
place outside the U.S.201 Further, the MDSA did not identify where
the sales were to take place.202
In sum, the court concluded that Genius could not be liable for
direct infringement with respect to lenses sold abroad into Apple and
Motorola’s supply chains.203 As to these lenses, the court granted
summary judgment of no direct infringement. 204
However, the court did not agree with Genius’s non-infringement defense that the sample lenses sent directly to Apple in the U.S.
were “de minimis.”205 While the “de minimis” exception to patent
infringement can provide a defense where infringement has been
“performed for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry,” there was no evidence that the sample lenses

196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205

Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1111–12.
Id. at 1111.
Id. at 1111–12.
Id. at 1112.
Id. at 1113.
Id.
Id. at 1113–14.
Id. at 1114.
Id. at 1116.
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sent directly by Genius into the U.S. satisfied any of these narrow
categories.206 Thus, the court granted summary judgment of direct
infringement with respect to the lenses that Genius sent directly into
the U.S.207
The court also granted summary judgment of no induced infringement for all but two of the lenses sold into Apple’s and
Motorola’s respective supply chains.208 Largan failed to prove either
that Genius knew that its lenses were incorporated into Apple or
Motorola products sold in the U.S. or that Genius had been willfully
blind about the incorporation of these lenses in products sold in the
U.S.209 As to the actual knowledge requirement, the parties agreed
that Genius had no insight into Apple’s and Motorola’s supply
chains after selling its lenses to the module integrators and that Genius had no knowledge about whether its lenses were incorporated
into products that were eventually sold in the U.S.210 In fact, as far
as Genius was aware, Apple and Motorola’s supply chains could
have been structured such that all of their products sold in the U.S.
used lenses sold not by Genius, but by Largan or other lens suppliers.211 As a result, even if Genius had induced Apple and Motorola
to use its lenses, it lacked actual knowledge that the induced acts
were infringing because the Apple and Motorola products using its
lenses could have been sold entirely outside the U.S.212
However, there was a material factual dispute about whether Genius had known that it was the sole supplier of two particular lens
designs used in Apple and Motorola products during certain time
periods and would therefore have known that products incorporating
those lens designs and sold in the U.S. used Genius lenses. 213 In an
internal Genius email chain discussing one such lens incorporated
into an Apple end product, one email stated that the lens was “sole

206

Id. (quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Service Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2000)).
207
Id. at 1116.
208
Id. at 1120.
209
Id. at 1119–20.
210
Id. at 1118.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id. at 1118–20.
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sourced,” indicating that Genius was the sole supplier, while another
email sought to “find out Largan[’s] current price,” indicating that
Largan might also be a source for the lens design at issue. 214 A Genius employee had also stated in deposition that in “an earlier program . . . we were the single source supplier,” although the transcript
of this deposition failed to identify the Motorola product for which
Genius was the sole supplier or whether that product even used an
accused lens or was sold in the U.S.215 Further, Largan’s data
showed no lens sales for a particular Apple product after the second
quarter of 2013, which Largan argued showed that Genius was the
sole supplier of lenses for that product; here, however, Largan had
failed to show how Genius could have known this even if it had been
true.216 Given the conflicting evidence, the court elected not to grant
summary judgment one way or the other on the issue of induced
infringement by these two particular lens designs.217
Turning to the requirement of willful blindness, the fact that Genius had apparently never discussed whether the Apple and
Motorola products using its accused lenses were sold in the U.S. or
asked Apple and Motorola not to ship products using its lenses into
the U.S. showed, at best, deliberate indifference to a known risk of
infringement.218 This fell short of the standard for proving willful
blindness, which requires an affirmative act to remain ignorant of
infringing conduct rather than mere failure to take deliberate actions
to determine whether the conduct infringes. 219 Further, even if Genius had asked Apple and Motorola about these issues, nothing indicated that Apple or Motorola could or would have told Genius
how many of its lenses made their way into products sold in the
U.S.220 In fact, Apple had stated that it did not track which lenses
were used in its products sold in the U.S.221 Thus, Largan had failed

214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221

Id. at 1119.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 1120.
Id.
Id.
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to prove willful blindness. The court granted summary judgment of
no inducement for all but two of Genius’s accused lens products. 222
As discussed in Parts II and III above, sales transactions in which
the products are sold, manufactured, and delivered abroad and never
enter the U.S. are unlikely to qualify as directly infringing sales or
offers to sell within the U.S.223 However, if those products are later
brought into the U.S. by third parties, the original providers of the
products may face liability for induced infringement under certain
circumstances. Given the ubiquity of Chinese manufacturing in the
global marketplace, this can be a concern of Chinese companies that
manufacture and sell components to be incorporated into products
that their customers bring into the U.S., or that manufacture products
that are then picked up by distributors who distribute products in the
U.S.
As Largan showed, the defendant’s state of mind and knowledge
of where its products ultimately end up can be the difference between liability and no liability for induced infringement. In Largan,
Genius, a Taiwanese lenses provider, was found not to have induced
infringement for the vast majority of its accused lenses because it
had no knowledge about whether these lenses were incorporated
into products that eventually made their way into the U.S. 224 For all
Genius knew, its lenses could have been used only in products that
were sold abroad and never entered the U.S. 225 In addition, the plaintiff failed to show any affirmative acts by Genius to stay ignorant of
infringement that could qualify as willful blindness. 226 Thus, neither
the actual knowledge nor willful blindness requirements of induced
infringement had been satisfied.
This outcome on the issue of inducement, in combination with
the court’s determination that Genius had not directly infringed by
selling its lenses into Apple and Motorola’s respective supply
chains,227 would likely have been a very favorable outcome for Genius. Although Genius’s accused lenses met the elements of the
222
223
224
225
226
227

Id.
See supra §§ II.B.1 (discussing Lake Cherokee), III.B.1(discussing Halo).
Largan, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 1117–20.
Id. at 1118.
Id. at 1120.
Id. at 1110–14.
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asserted patent claims, the court had concluded that almost all of the
accused conduct had taken place outside the territorial reach of the
U.S. patent laws.228 Thus, Genius could not be liable for patent infringement for the majority of its accused sales activities.229
On a cautionary note, this outcome could have been different if
the documents and deposition testimony had indicated that Genius
was and knew that it was the sole supplier for a larger number of
lens designs used in Apple and Motorola’s products (as opposed to
only two such designs).230 In such a situation, Genius may have lost
on the inducement issue at the summary judgment stage for a greater
percentage of its accused lens products. Similarly, Genius may not
have prevailed on the issue of induced infringement if it had visibility into Apple and Motorola’s respective sales cycles or known that
its products eventually reached the U.S., whether as standalone components or through incorporation in products that were eventually
brought into the U.S.231 The circumstances of each case must be individually assessed to determine potential liability for induced infringement, in light of the fact-intensive nature of this inquiry.
2. Opticurrent v. Power Integrations
In Opticurrent, LLC v. Power Integrations, Incorporated, the
court granted-in-part the defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law to reduce the royalty base used to calculate damages for
patent infringement to 6%—rather than one-third—of worldwide
sales of accused chips.232 In essence, this reduced the defendant’s
damages exposure to 6% of its previous amount.
At trial, the jury had awarded the plaintiff, Opticurrent, LLC
(“Opticurrent”), patent infringement damages of approximately
$6.7 million, calculated using a royalty rate of 3% and a royalty base
of approximately $222 million.233 The royalty base had been derived
from the defendant, Power Integrations, Inc.’s (“PI”) sales revenue
228

Id. at 1107.
Id.
230
Id. at 1118–20.
231
Id.
232
Opticurrent, LLC v. Power Integrations, Inc., No. 17-cv-03597-EMC, 2019 U.S.
LEXIS 94615, at *21 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2019).
233
Id. at *11.
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from April 2010 through March 2018. 234 During this time, PI’s
worldwide sales of the accused chips totaled approximately $667
million, one third ($222 million) of which were estimated to have
eventually entered the U.S.235
In post-trial briefing, PI argued that the royalty base was unsupported by the evidence because Opticurrent’s argument that one
third of PI’s accused chips entered the U.S. had been based on an
inducement theory236 and the jury had found no inducement at
trial.237 Therefore, PI argued, the one-third figure was not a reliable
basis for the damages award and should be reduced to the 6% of PI’s
sales that were attributable to direct infringement. 238
As an initial matter, the court noted that PI’s argument implicated two fundamental principles of patent law.239 The first principle
was that the royalty base for reasonable royalty damages cannot include activities that do not qualify as patent infringement because
patent damages must be limited to damages that are adequate to
compensate for infringement.240 The second principle was that the
U.S. patent laws must be understood against a background presumption against extraterritorial reach.241
The evidence at trial showed that PI made, used, and sold the
vast majority of its accused chips outside the U.S. 242 While the accused chips were designed in California, they were manufactured in
Asia and overwhelmingly sold in China.243 PI only sold 5-6% of its
products in the U.S.,244 and the sales transactions for its products
that were sold abroad took place outside of the U.S. 245

234

Id.
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id. at *11–12.
239
Id. at *12.
240
Id. at *12 (quoting Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co., Ltd.,
909 F.3d 398, 411–12 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
241
Id. (quoting Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp. Ltd., 807 F.3d 1293, 1306
(Fed. Cir. 2015)).
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Id. at *12–13.
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Id. at *13.
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In relevant part, third-party buyers of PI’s products would incorporate PI’s chips into power supply products and then sell those
products to downstream customers.246 PI estimated that one third of
its accused chips eventually made their way into the U.S. through
these third-party products, based on a general rule of thumb that
30% of electronic products made globally are consumed in the
U.S.247 Importantly, PI’s Vice President of Worldwide Sales had testified that only 5-6% of PI’s sales were domestic and that it was PI’s
customers, not PI, that imported the accused chips into the U.S.248
Opticurrent introduced no evidence at trial to controvert the Vice
President’s testimony that only 5-6% of PI’s revenue was domestic.249
Based on this record, the court found that the jury could reasonably conclude that the proper royalty base for direct infringement
damages was 6% of PI’s worldwide sales because that was the portion of revenue derived from accused chips that PI itself had made,
used, sold, or offered to sell within the U.S. 250 But, the court also
found that there was no evidentiary basis for a jury to determine that
the remainder of PI’s accused products that eventually reached the
U.S. could be included in the royalty base for direct infringement
because the undisputed testimony of PI’s Vice President established
that those products were imported not by PI, but by its customers. 251
Thus, PI could only be liable for damages arising from the domestic
sales of those products if the jury found that PI induced its customers
to infringe—which the jury had found it did not.252 As such, the
jury’s use of the royalty base of one third of PI’s worldwide sales in
calculating damages for direct infringement was unsupported by the
evidence.253

246

Id.
Id.
248
Id. at *13–14 (“Q: And who is it that is importing that third into the United States? A:
That’s a good question. We’re kind of disconnected from that part of the process because
we’re not involved in it. But I could imagine it’s companies like Dell or Samsung
themselves would move their goods around the world and bring them into the U.S.”).
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Id. at *14.
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Id.
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Id. at *14–15.
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Id. at *15.
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Id. (citing Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1028 (9th Cir. 2008)).
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Opticurrent argued that the jury had used the correct royalty
base, analogizing the one third royalty base to the royalty base in
Marvell of accused chips that had likewise been manufactured and
sold abroad but were ultimately imported into the U.S.254 The court
rejected this argument. 255 Critically, Marvell was distinguishable
because the jury found that the defendant, Marvell, had both directly
and indirectly infringed the asserted patent claims.256 It was this
finding of inducement, which was absent in Opticurrent’s case
against PI, that allowed the jury to impose liability on Marvell for
chips that were imported into the U.S. by Marvell’s customers. 257
Marvell did not stand for the proposition, as Opticurrent contended, that a finding of direct infringement alone would confer liability on the infringer for every subsequent sale, use, or importation
by its customers, irrespective of whether the infringer had
knowledge or foresight of its customers’ actions.258 Such an interpretation would have rendered moot inducement as a separate basis
for liability where accused products eventually and indirectly entered into the U.S.,259 as liability would apply no matter how remote,
unintended, or unforeseeable the ultimate importation of the end
product incorporating the accused product was. 260 Instead, a finding
of induced infringement requires a showing of direct infringement
by a third party under Section 271(a).261 Thus, the assessment of indirect infringement damages in Marvell was predicated on, but did
not automatically follow from, the finding that Marvell’s customers
had directly infringed.262
Opticurrent additionally contended that PI had waived its challenge to the “one third” royalty base by failing to object to it before

254

Id. at *15–16.
Id. at *16.
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Id. at *16–17 (citing Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d
1283, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
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Id. at *17 (quoting Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp.,
531 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2007)).
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and during trial.263 The court disagreed, reasoning that PI had expressly preserved its challenge in its opposition to Opticurrent’s motions in limine; raised its challenge at trial by eliciting its Vice President’s testimony that only 6% of PI’s revenue derived from its domestic sales; and filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, in
which it had expressly argued that the majority of Opticurrent’s alleged damages were based on a theory of inducement and therefore
at least 94% of PI’s pre-suit sales had to be excluded from the damages base.264 As such, PI had not waived its challenge to the royalty
base.265
In conclusion, the court agreed with PI that there was no evidentiary basis to support a royalty base of $222 million, i.e., one third
of its worldwide sales of the accused chips.266 Rather, the evidence
could only support a royalty base of 6% of PI’s worldwide sales for
those chips.267 Thus, the court granted PI’s motion for judgment as
a matter of law as to the royalty base and adjusted the royalty base
to 6%, or $40 million, of PI’s worldwide sales. 268 Applying a 3%
royalty rate, this resulted in a damages figure of approximately
$1.20 million.269
The extraterritoriality defense can be used to limit the royalty
base for calculating damages to a fraction of the company’s global
sales before, during, and after trial. If implemented successfully, this
defense can significantly reduce damages exposure for companies
that make most of their sales outside the U.S.
In Opticurrent, the royalty base used by the jury in calculating
damages for patent infringement was initially limited to one third of
PI’s relevant worldwide sales because one third was the portion estimated to have entered the U.S.270 After trial, the royalty base was
further reduced from one third to 6% of PI’s worldwide sales because the one third base rested on the plaintiff’s theory that PI had
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
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induced infringement—and the jury found no inducement at trial.271
For companies in similar situations that lack clarity as to whether
their internationally sold products eventually enter the U.S., a similar reduction of the available damages pool can limit damages exposure and encourage favorable settlement.
It is therefore critical to preserve all objections to the use of a
royalty base that improperly includes foreign sales activity falling
beyond the reach of the U.S. patent laws. As Opticurrent demonstrates, such objections may take the form of motion in limine briefing; witness testimony or documentary evidence establishing the
percentage of revenue derived from domestic sales; or post-trial motions to limit damages based on the foreign nature of the company’s
sales.272
3. Tessera v. Broadcom
In Tessera, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., the court denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel the production of technical documents for
products not shipped into the U.S. in the past six years, in addition
to worldwide sales data for all accused products. 273
The plaintiff, Tessera, Inc. (“Tessera”), sought an order compelling the defendant, Broadcom Corporation (“Broadcom”), to produce die specifications, Graphic Database System (“GDS”) files,
data sheets, process flows and recipes, and other core technical documents for accused semiconductor chips that Broadcom argued
were not shipped to recipients in the U.S.274 Tessera also sought an
order compelling Broadcom to produce worldwide sales data for all
of its accused semiconductor chips, including end customer information, such as “Parent_End_Name,” “Sold_To_Parent,” and “End
Cust Name.”275
As to the core technical documents, Broadcom objected on
grounds of relevance.276 Specifically, Broadcom argued that the
271

Id. at *11–18.
Id. at *18–19.
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Tessera, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. Civ. A. 16-380, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178929,
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accused semiconductor chips were not made, used, sold, or imported
into the U.S., and therefore did not fall within the reach of the U.S.
patent laws and were therefore not relevant to the case. 277 In response, Tessera pointed to Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. Broadcom
Ltd., which Broadcom had also been a defendant in. 278 In Godo Kaisha, the defendants, including Broadcom, moved for summary judgment that the accused Broadcom semiconductor chips that were ordered, manufactured, shipped, billed, and delivered to buyers abroad
did not qualify as infringing sales within the U.S.279 The magistrate
judge recommended denying the motion, reasoning that a reasonable jury could find that “many substantial activities” relating to sales
of the chip products occurred in the U.S. and thus these sales could
qualify as U.S.-based sales under Section 271(a). 280 Tessera argued
that the magistrate judge’s analysis in Godo Kaisha was relevant
because over 80% of the accused chips overlapped with the accused
products in the Godo Kaisha case.281
The court disagreed, noting that it had not been provided with
the underlying documents that the court in the Godo Kaisha case
had relied on to reach its conclusions.282 Tessera therefore failed to
meet its burden of showing the relevance of technical documents for
semiconductor chips not shipped to a U.S. recipient. 283
As for the worldwide sales data, Broadcom made a similar objection that its sales made outside the U.S. were not relevant to Tessera’s U.S.-based patent infringement claims. 284 Tessera argued that
chip makers, such as Broadcom, could be liable for indirect infringement if they sold infringing products overseas that were later imported into the U.S.285 For example, the accused products could be
incorporated into third-party products that were subsequently sold
277
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in the U.S.286 In response, Broadcom argued that Tessera was not
entitled to foreign sales information based on speculation that
Broadcom sold internationally to customers who then imported the
accused products into the U.S.287 Instead, Broadcom argued, Tessera
should be required to test its theory through discovery. 288 To this
end, Broadcom had offered to identify its top 20 customers based on
worldwide sales so that Tessera could seek discovery from those
customers to determine whether any Broadcom products sold internationally ended up in products that were later imported into the
U.S.289 Here, Broadcom directed Tessera to its third-party customers
because Broadcom did not track where its products ended up after
shipment to its customers abroad, and therefore could not know
which, if any, of those products later entered the U.S. 290
The court agreed that Tessera had failed to provide more than
mere speculation regarding its allegation of indirect infringement. 291
Although Tessera identified Broadcom customers with a large presence in the U.S. and representative downstream products incorporating Broadcom’s products, the court held that these showings were
neither specific nor concrete.292 Rather, they required the court to
assume that accused Broadcom products incorporated into thirdparty downstream products were later sold in the U.S. because those
third parties had a presence in the U.S.293 Thus, Tessera failed to
identify evidence demonstrating that the Broadcom products actually entered the U.S.294 The court denied Tessera’s motion to compel.295
As discussed, a successful foreign sales defense can be utilized
early in discovery. In Tessera, Broadcom successfully opposed Tessera’s discovery motion for worldwide sales data by pointing out
that Tessera had failed to take the threshold step of proving that the
286
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data were relevant to the case.296 Tessera speculated that Broadcom’s customers might import and sell the accused chips in the U.S.,
but provided no evidence that Broadcom’s chips sold abroad ended
up in products that later reached the U.S. 297 Broadcom’s proposal
that Tessera seek discovery from its customers about whether the
accused products reached the U.S. had two effects: it emphasized
that Tessera had the burden to prove the relevance of the worldwide
sales data, and it underscored Broadcom’s lack of knowledge about
what happened to its accused products after they were shipped
abroad, as required to prove liability for induced infringement. 298
This strategy can be effective in defending against induced infringement claims for companies that do not track or otherwise have
knowledge about where their products end up after the products are
sold to customers outside the U.S. In such situations, the plaintiff
may be forced to take the time-consuming route of conducting third
party discovery to prove the relevance of worldwide sales data, assuming that the subpoenaed third parties are willing to provide the
often confidential and sensitive information sought. Third parties
may, for example, agree only to provide a limited subset of the information sought, move to quash a subpoena or resist a motion to
enforce a subpoena, or simply lack the information sought. Further,
the standard for compelling discovery from a third party is higher
than it is for parties to a case.299 As a result, it is possible that the
plaintiff may emerge empty-handed in its search for information tying the company’s accused conduct to the U.S.
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CONCLUSION

Chinese companies have seen tremendous success in the U.S.
market. They have also experienced the downside that can come
with the territory, including increased exposure to patent litigation
in the U.S. Nevertheless, there are effective tools for mitigating the
risk of patent infringement liability and reducing potential damages
exposure that can supplement the traditional defense that an accused
product does not satisfy all of the limitations of the asserted claims.
For companies that conduct all or a significant percentage of
their sales-related activities outside the U.S., one such tool is the
defense that sales and offers to sell outside the U.S. cannot infringe
a U.S. patent. In Halo, the Federal Circuit held that the domestic
activities of the defendant, Pulse, were insufficient to qualify as infringing sales or offers to sell.300 The court’s reasoning was that purchase orders were submitted and processed outside the U.S.; the accused surface mount electronic packages were manufactured,
shipped, and delivered outside the U.S.; and the electronic packages
never entered the U.S.301 Similarly, in Lake Cherokee, the defendant, Marvell, was able to obtain a summary judgment ruling that
77% of the sales of its allegedly infringing chips had occurred outside the U.S.302 As a result, those sales fell outside the purview of
the U.S. patent laws and could not infringe the asserted U.S. patents.303
Not all litigants will prevail on these types of summary judgment
motions, however. As MediaTek showed, the success of a foreign
sales defense may be determined by the provisions of a supply
agreement or the structure of sales transactions.304 In that case, summary judgment of non-infringement was denied because all relevant
sales were governed by the provisions of an agreement between the
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defendant, Freescale, a U.S. company, and AFS, another U.S. company, and also because it was Freescale itself that received and processed the purchase orders for the products at issue.305 As a result,
there were issues of material fact about whether the sales had occurred in the U.S. that could not be resolved at the summary judgment stage.306 Similarly, in SignalQuest, there were material issues
of fact about whether certain quotations sent to companies in North
Carolina and Texas qualified as offers to sell within the U.S.307
There, the quotations at issue identified the accused sensor product
and its price per unit based on the quantity desired. 308 As a result,
the court denied the Defendants’ summary judgment motion.309
Companies should review their sales agreements, transactions, and
related practices to determine the viability of a motion for summary
judgment of non-infringement.
In addition, companies that have no knowledge of the eventual
disposition of their products and/or no intent to encourage infringement can raise this lack of knowledge and intent as a defense to a
claim of induced infringement. In Largan, the defendant, Genius,
obtained summary judgment that it had not induced infringement by
showing that it had no knowledge regarding Apple and Motorola’s
respective supply chains after selling its lenses to foreign module
integrators and, moreover, no knowledge about whether its lenses
sold abroad were used in products that later made their way to the
U.S. market.310 Additionally, Genius never discussed whether the
Apple and Motorola products using its lenses were sold in the U.S.
or asked that these products not be shipped into the U.S. 311 Companies in similar situations should likewise determine the viability of
such a defense.
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In cases where a company successfully defends against claims
of induced infringement, it is critical to ensure that damages based
on theories of inducement are excluded from the overall damages
determination. This can result in a significant reduction in liability.
In Opticurrent, the defendant, PI, prevailed in its post-trial arguments that the royalty base should be reduced from one third of its
worldwide sales to 6% of those sales. 312 There, PI successful argued
that the one third base was unsupported because it was based on the
plaintiff’s theory that PI had induced infringement and the jury had
reached a verdict of no induced infringement. As a result, the court
adjusted the royalty base from $222 million to $40 million.313
The foreign sales defense can be implemented at various stages
in a patent case. With that said, it is a critical strategy that should be
put into action at the earliest juncture in a case. There is no reason
not to incorporate foreign sales considerations into an initial investigation at the beginning of a case, including by reviewing business
practices and interviewing employees who are knowledgeable about
the company’s sales processes. Companies should also make best
efforts to limit discovery to their domestic activities from the beginning of the discovery phase, as doing so can significantly reduce the
heavy burden and expenses associated with discovery and, moreover, increase prospects for a favorable settlement. For example, the
denial of a motion to compel foreign sales discovery will effectively
deny the plaintiff the discovery it needs to prove that the defendant’s
worldwide sales are not, in fact, outside the scope of its U.S. patent
infringement claims. It may also force the plaintiff to take a more
expensive and time-consuming route to prove that foreign sales discovery is relevant to the case. As an example, in Tessera, the defendant, Broadcom, successfully opposed a motion to compel by
pointing out that the plaintiff had failed to identify any information
that was specific to the accused chips or third-party makers of downstream products, or otherwise show that Broadcom’s chips sold
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abroad entered the U.S.314 As McGinley showed, though, a company’s own conflicting testimony and documents can be harmful to
its attempts to convince a court to limit discovery in this way. 315 As
such, care must be taken in constructing discovery strategy.
Though the uptick in U.S. patent cases filed against Chinese
companies is a recent phenomenon, the case law concerning other
foreign litigants is instructive in forming effective strategies and
identifying mistakes to avoid in implementing the foreign sales defense. As these cases show, the extraterritoriality defense can be effective during the initial investigation, discovery, dispositive motion, and trial stages. As these cases further demonstrate, this defense can be critical in significantly reducing the pool of available
damages or, in some cases, disposing of liability and damages exposure altogether. As a result, the successful deployment of the foreign
sales defense can also encourage a more favorable settlement for the
defendant.
As Chinese companies transition from followers to innovators
in the years to come, they may find themselves on the other side of
U.S. patent litigations—that is, as patent holders and plaintiffs. Until
then, the courts have provided guidance and a framework that will
be critical to navigating U.S. patent cases.
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